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THE DECLINE OF THE PURCHASER-SELLER REQUIREMENT
OF RULE 10b-5
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder proscribe fraud by any person "in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security."' In 1946 the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in the case of Karden v. National
Gypsum Co. 2 interpreted rule 10b-5 to provide a private cause of action
for defrauded sellers and, 5 years later, the Second Circuit recognized
a similar right of purchasers.3 The determination of what activities and
persons are within the proscription of lOb-5 became and continues to be
a perplexing judicial problem. The operative language which has given
rise to the confusion in this area is the phrase "in connection with the
sale or purchase of any security." This language is found in both section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 4 and was first read to limit private actions under
10b-5 to actual purchasers or sellers. 5 This interpretation, however, is
1. Section 10 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange(b) To* use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964).
Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
2. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
3. E.g., Fishman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951). It is now
generally established that a private right of enforcement exists under lob-5. See, e.g.,
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d
781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 879 (1965) ; McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292
F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1962) (dictum) ; Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d
195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
Karden and the many decisions following it have used as the basis for the
private cause of action the theory that a private right of enforcement is permitted
absent clear congressional intent to the contrary. The courts have relied upon
RESTATEMENT op TORTS § 286 (1934). See Comment, Private Rights From Federal
Statutes: Toward A Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 454, 456-59 (1968).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 956 (1953) ; accord, Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th
Cir. 1967) ; Chasin v. Mencher, 255 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; O'Neill v.
230University
F. Supp.Charles
235 (S.D.N.Y.),
F.2dRepository,
764 (2d 1969
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presently under attack,6 and the exact meaning of the phrase is unclear.
This Comment will explore the development of judicial construction of
7
this phrase.
II.

THE PURCHASER-SELLER REQUIREMENT

The strict purchaser-seller limitation was first enunciated by the
Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.8 The plaintiffs,
minority shareholders of Newport Steel Corporation, brought a combined
derivative suit and class action alleging that defendants, members of the
corporation's board of directors, breached their fiduciary duty to the
corporation when the defendant president of Newport caused the directors
to reject a merger which would have been profitable to all Newport shareholders. Subsequently, the president sold his controlling interest in the
corporation at a substantial premium. The purchaser, a corporation, intended to use Newport as a "captive" source of steel during a market
shortage. Immediately after the sale, Newport's board of directors resigned and were replaced by men controlled by the purchaser. The plaintiffs also alleged other specific acts of fraud consisting of misrepresentative
letters sent by the board of directors to the shareholders informing them
of the transaction. Plaintiffs argued that the president's action of causing
the board of directors to reject the initial offer of purchase and the subsequent sale by the president of his stock to the purchaser constituted a
violation of rule 10b-5 since that rule's protection may be exercised by
persons other than defrauded purchasers or sellers and "the general proscription of fraud 'upon any person' includes and supplements the common law liability of those who abuse the trust of their corporate posiv. North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); New Park Mining

Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See also General Time Corp. v.
American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Allied Artists
Picture Corp. v. D. Kattmen & Co., 283 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Studebaker
Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Lowenfels, The
Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era For Rule 10b-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268,
270 (1968). The purchaser-seller requirement has been weakened by the case of
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) ; see Entel v. Allen, 270
F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
6. E.g., Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Lowenfels, supra

note 5; Comment, The Purchaser-SellerLimitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53

CORNELL

L.Q. 684 (1968). See also Comment, Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An
Injunction For a Corporate Issuer?, 115 U. PA. L. Rzv. 618 (1967).
7. All of the cases discussed in this Comment pertain to an actual fraudulent
scheme by a corporate director, and the issue is simply whether a purchaser-seller
status is required by the language of rule lob-5. Thus, problems raised by SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), noted in 14 VILL. L. Rev. 140
(1968), concerning fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions to state material facts
will not be discussed. Many of the problems raised by Texas Gulf Sulphur are
discussed in Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur - The Second Round: Privity and State of
Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchaseand Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423 (1968). See also
authorities collected in 14 VILL. L. Rv. 140, 141 n.4 (1968). Also, areas such as
scienter and reliance are not discussed. For a discussion of these elements, see
Bahlman, Rule 10b-5: The Case For its Full Acceptance As Federal Corporation
Law, 37 U. CIN. L. Rzv. 727, 761-69 (1968). The problem of causation will be
indirectly discussed when the limitation of lOb-5 to matters properly federal in
character is considered. See pp. 509-10, 515-16 infra.
8. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1953).
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tions." Furthermore, plaintiffs contended that the words "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of securities supports their position since that
phrase would be superfluous if only actual purchasers could obtain a lOb-5
remedy.' 0
The court, looking to legislative history, rejected plaintiffs' argument
on two grounds. First, it found that the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5
merely to close a loophole in section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,11
which only declared as unlawful fraud or deceit on purchasers of securities 12 and, secondly, that Congress did not intend section 10(b) to be used
to proscribe a breach of fiduciary duty.1 3 The court held that section
10(b) "was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent
practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather
than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs, and that Rule X10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or seller.'

14

Birnbaum's reliance on legislative and administrative history to determine that only defrauded purchasers or sellers have private remedies
under lOb-5 appears misplaced. 15 In the Supreme Court decision of J. I.
Case Co. v. Borak,16 the Court was confronted with the question whether
a cause of action was available to protect private interests under the
Exchange Act's proxy regulation section, 14(a) .17 As with section 10(b),
there was no legislative history to directly support a private cause of action
under section 14(a), yet the Court determined that such a remedy existed.
For support the Supreme Court stressed the congressional purpose of the
section, determining that while the language of 14(a) "makes no specific
reference to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is 'the
protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial
relief where necessary to achieve that result."1 8 It was added that courts
have a duty "to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose."' 19 Since section 10(b), like
9. Id. at 463.
10. Id.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
12. 193 F.2d at 463. The court said: "[O]n May 21, 1942, the SEC adopted
Rule X-10B-5 to close this '* * * loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities
if they engage in fraud in their purchase.' SEC Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942."
13. Id.

14. Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
15. Birnbaum's reliance on the legislative history has been severely critized by
commentators. See, e.g., Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L.
Riv. 725, 833 (1956) ; Comment, Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An Injunction For a Corporate IssuerP, supra note 6, at 622-23.
16. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
17. Securities Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1965).
18. 377 U.S. at 432. See generally Comment, supra note 3, at 454.
19. 377 U.S. at 433. It has been argued that the development of a private action
under lOb-5 is not justified by the legislative history of section 10(b). See Cohen,
Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities, 28 Ggo. WASH. L.
Rzv. 119, 124 n.17 (1959) ; Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur - The Second Round: Privity
and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 423, 430
(1968) ; University
Ruder, Civil
Liability
Revision
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20
14(a), was passed for the protection of investors and, as the following
discussion will indicate, there are many situations in which an investor
may be injured in the course of transactions "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," before he actually sold or purchased such
a security, it would appear to be within the congressional purpose of 10(b)
to allow private parties injured by fraud which was connected with a
securities transaction to use rule 10b-5 as a remedy. In line with this
21
reasoning the Seventh Circuit in Jordan Bldg. Corp. v. Doyle, has recently applied the Borak reasoning to a lob-5 case, thus indicating that
the purpose of section 10(b) would be served by allowing a private action under rule lOb-5.
Birnbaum's finding that the SEC only intended lOb-5 to close a
loophole in section 17(a) is also misplaced. An indication of this may
be gleaned from the amicus curiae briefs submitted by the Commission.
The SEC has maintained that a strict purchaser-seller requirement is too
narrow and argued in Birnbaum that a party can obtain lOb-5 relief
whenever the rule is violated and plaintiff's stock loses value as a result

of the violation.

22

The decline of Birnbaum's actual purchaser-seller limitation, should
not, however, expand rule lOb-5 to cover the traditional state common
23
Indeed,
law liability for fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs.
it has been suggested that the plaintiff's broad allegations that lOb-5 supplements the common law liability of corporate fiduciary responsibility
24
was the reason for the Second Circuit's narrow interpretation of lOb-5.
Thus, it is possible that in the court's zeal to show its disfavor with this
broad interpretation it established the purchaser-seller requirement without fully realizing the implications of such a result. Nonetheless, it has
been said that the decisions in the decline of the Birnbauin doctrine indicate that at the present time liability for any fraud by a corporate
25
The adoption of such an allfiduciary may be litigated under 10b-5.

encompassing result would be unfortunate and would justify the criticism
made of the judicial expansion of private actions under lOb-5 that this
development lacks the careful debate and limitations which congressional
enactment would give it, particularly in an area such as corporate law
26
Since there is a
which has been traditionally regulated by the states.
Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 627 (1963). The Borak case should, however, put an end
to this criticism. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIEs REGULATION CASES
AND MATERIALS 847 n.3 (2d ed. 1968).

20. See note 1 supra.
21. 401 F.2d 47, 49-50 (7th Cir. 1968). See Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco,
Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 543 (2d Cir. 1967).
22. See Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634, 636 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967) ; A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967).
23. See p. 503 infra.
24. Leech, Transactionsin CorporateControl, 104 U. PA. L. Rev. 725, 834 (1956).
25. Bahlman, supra note 7, at 761 n.151.
26. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 70 & n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Ruder,
Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporationsby Implication Through
Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. Rev. 185, 188-91 (1964) ; Comment, Rule 10b-5 Corporate
Mismanagement Cases: Who Must Deceive Whom?, 63 Nw. U.L. Rev. 477, 483 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/7
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503

danger of usurping a state interest without justification, the courts, as
indicated by Birnbaum, have a responsibility for limiting 10b-5 actions
to securities transactions covered by the statute.
In Borak, the Supreme Court found that the congressional purpose
justifying a private cause of action under 14(a) was manifested in the
language of the section.27 Since it appears proper to look to the purpose
of section 10(b) to find justification for a private cause of action under
rule 10b-5, 28 the language of the section should be respected by the courts.
This can be accomplished by reading the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security" to require that the fraud which a private
party may litigate under rule 10b-5 have a connection with a securities
transaction, rather than to automatically include all illicit corporate transgressions under the rule. Since rule 10b-5 applies to both direct and
indirect means used to defraud, almost any fraudulent device arguably
could be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Although a shareholder should be given legal rights of redress for all
breaches of fiduciary duty and fraud, it is doubtful that the congressional
purpose in exacting section 10(b) was to cover these situations. 29 Although it is true that investors and shareholders are one and the same,
and that which affects a person as a shareholder necessarily affects him
as an investor, nevertheless the Exchange Act was passed to protect
security investors. Thus, with the decline of a strict purchaser-seller requirement the "in connection with" language becomes more important
as a limitation.
The decisions which have modified Birnbaum have done so in two
ways. First, the cases have expanded the concept of purchaser or seller.
Since these decisions rest on a finding that an actual or constructive purchaser or seller is involved, they are easily justified by reliance on the
congressional purpose. Second, and more controversial, is the recent
tendency to read the "in connection with" phrase to provide a rule 10b-5
remedy when the fraudulent practice merely affects the purchase or sale
of a security. Discussion of this later development will follow an analysis
of the cases expanding the purchaser-seller doctrine.
III.

EXPANSION OF THE PURCHASER-SELLER CONCEPT

A.

Corporate Issuer

The finding that a corporate issuer is a seller of stock and therefore
entitled to relief under rule 10b-5 is not, in itself, significant. The transfer
of shares for a valuable consideration is in fact a sale and logically should
be included in 10b-5. 30 However, the analysis used by the courts to de27. 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
28. See pp. 501-02 supra.
29. See Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 290 F. Supp. 934, 936 (N.D. Ohio 1968) ; Lester
v. Preco Indus., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See pp. 501-02 supra.
30. The terms "sale" and "sell" are broadly defined in the Act: "The terms sale
to School
sell or of
otherwise
dispose
of." 1969
Securities Exchange
sell eachUniversity
include any
contract
Publishedand
by Villanova
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Law Digital
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termine that a corporate issuer is a seller is an indication of their discontent with a literal reading of the rule.
In Hooper v. Mountain Sec. Corp.,31 plaintiff, trustee in bankruptcy,
sought relief on behalf of a corporation which was allegedly misled by
fraud into issuing stock for worthless assets. Determining that the corporate issuer had standing to sue under rule 10b-5, the court dismissed
a possible implied limitation that an investor status is required. Arguably
such a limitation could exist since the section states that it is for the protection of investors; thus, only investors injured by fraud in a purchase or
sale context could use the rule for a remedy. The court, however, looked
to the congressional grant of authority to the SEC contained in section
10(b) and found that Commission rules could be promulgated to foster
32
It
"the public interest" as well as for the "protection of investors."
was reasoned that 10(b) was passed to protect both of these interests,
and that prevention of the abuses of corporate issuers came within the
purpose of protecting the public interest, which interest by judicial interpretation is limited to those persons specifically injured, i.e., in a manner
other than as a member of the general public.8 3 Thus, 10b-5 protects
"persons who would be engaged in buying and selling and trading in
corporate securities," and this group necessarily includes the corporate
issuer.8 4 The court then determined that regulation of the issuance of
85
securities under 10b-5 would foster the legislative purpose of 10(b).
Thus, the court did not feel that a strict reading of the statute was required,
but instead stressed the legislative purpose to read expansively the terms
purchaser and seller. Although the court was not concerned specifically
with the "in connection with" language of section 10(b), its holding is
a departure from Birnbaum's strict reading. Also, since an issuance of
securities was the basis of the fraud the court is not subject to criticism
for expanding 10b-5 beyond its intended purpose, i.e., the protection of
those connected with a securities transaction.
Hooper was relied upon by the Second Circuit in the more significant
case of Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.36 In Ruckle, plaintiff, the owner
of over 50 percent of the voting stock of defendant corporation, brought
a derivative suit to restrain defendant directors from consummating a
plan whereby the latter would retain control of defendant corporation by
fraudulently causing the corporation to issue 75,000 shares of treasury
Act § 3(a) (14), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1964). Equally broad are the terms

"buy"

and "purchase." "The terms 'buy' and 'purchase' each include any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire." Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(13), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a) (13) (1964).
31. 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960); accord, Brammer v. Rosenberg, CCH FXD.
Sec. L. Rep. 192,341 (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 29, 1969) ; Pappas v.Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d
Cir. 1968).
32. See note 1 supra.
33. The court referred to the tort theory of determining a private cause of action
from a federal statute. 282 F.2d at 202. See note 3 supra.
34. 282 F.2d at 202,
35. Id. at 203.
36. 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss3/7

6

Ciechon: The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule 10b-5
SPRING

1969]

COMMENTS

stock to defendant director. The fraud alleged was a refusal by the directors to disclose certain material facts regarding the financial condition of
the corporation. In adopting Hooper's finding that an issuing corporation
may be a seller 37 the court distinguished Birnbaum on the facts. It said
that Birnbaum involved an action against a director for fraud3 8 injuring
stockholders and thereby precluding a derivative suit on behalf of the
corporation, whereas in the present situation the corporation was actually
being defrauded into issuing shares. It continued, "absent statutory language to the contrary, a corporation that has not been the victim of fraud
cannot sue." 39 Birnbaum, it said, does not stand for the proposition that
a corporation which is actually defrauded into issuing securities is barred
from a 10b-5 remedy. Concerning the problem before it, the court added:
[A]s a result of the fraud perpetrated upon the issuing corporation,
overvalued stock may reach the market. Of course, it was precisely
the fear that such securities would be publicly distributed which
prompted Congress to enact the federal securities laws.4"
Ruckle apparently read Birnbaum in a limited sense, i.e., as only
standing for the proposition that the person seeking 10b-5 redress must,
himself, establish a "connection with" a security transaction. In 1964,
however, the time of the Ruckle decision, Birnbaum's strict purchaserseller requirement was still arguably in force. 41 Under such a requirement, it would be possible to find that the corporate issuer in Ruckle did
not have standing since it had yet to complete the issuance of securities
and was not a seller entitled to 10b-5 relief. However, if this result was
required under Birnbaum, its rejection appears proper. The Second Circuit has liberally interpreted both the SEC rule and Securities Exchange
Act in order to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting investors rather than relying on a rigid doctrine, and thereby has given
"seller status" to a person who has yet to sell shares. 42 Allowing a cor37. Id. at 27.
38. Id. at 27-28. The court also discussed Howard v. Furst, 238 F.2d 790 (2d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 937 (1957).
39. 339 F.2d at 28.
40. Id. See Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation To SEC Rule 10b-5,
supra note 6, at 694.
41. Decisions such as A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (lst Cir. 1967),
see p. 506 infra, and Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 970 (1967), see p. 508 infra, which distinguished Birnbaum's strict
purchaser-seller requirement in order to allow "abortive" and "constructive" sellers
respectively to obtain lOb-5 remedies, had not yet been decided. In both cases, a sale
was not completed. Brod involved a fraudulent order to purchase securities and
Vine a merger. However, since Ruckle was decided before these cases, there was still
a question as to whether a 101,-5 remedy could be obtained by a private party without
such party being defrauded by an actual and completed purchase or sale.
42. Since Ruckle concerned the ability of a corporation to obtain an injunction
to restrain the issuance of its shares by the directors, it could be argued that its
distinction of Birnbaum was not significant because of the unique situation involved.
When a private party learns of a fraud he may simply refuse to complete the transaction and thereby avoid injury, yet to obtain the same result a corporation, through
its shareholders, must seek an injunction since the party deceiving it is its own
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porate issuer an injunction to restrain a fraudulent issuance of shares
meets the "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" test,
since there is an actual security transaction which if carried out would
cause an injury. This result, furthermore, finds support in the line of
cases which have limited Birnbaum by permitting lOb-5 relief to persons who have been injured by fraud in a purchase-sale context, yet
have not actually sold or purchased securities.
B.

Abortive Seller

In A. T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 43 a broker brought an action under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 seeking monetary damages to compensate
him for defendant's fraudulent failure to pay for securities which he
had ordered through the plaintiff with the subjective reservation of paying for them only if they reached a certain price. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit found that it is not necessary to be an actual
purchaser or seller in order to maintain an action under the above provisions and that an aborted seller may therefore properly obtain relief.
Although the court did not mention Birnbaum, its analysis evidenced an
intent to expand that doctrine. The court found that "10(b) was aimed
at manipulative and deceptive devices which were employed 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security' and which contravened
the rules and regulations established by the Commission." 44 Furthermore, on the ground that the Act's protection was not limited to investors,
the court used an analysis similar to that in Hooper to find that the noninvestor broker had standing to maintain the suit. 45 The court said:

Nor do we think it sound to dismiss a complaint merely because
the alleged scheme does not involve the type of fraud that is "usually
associated with the sale or purchase of securities." We believe that
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 prohibit all fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, whether the artifices
employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or present a unique
form of deception. Novel or atypical
methods should not provide
46
immunity from the securities laws.
In reaching their decision the court mentioned that the SEC filed
an amicus curiae brief condemning the plaintiff's practice and noting its
director presently in power. However, the approach of the court indicated a liberal
view toward analyzing the standing problem.

There are two other areas in which the issue is the availability of an injunction under rule 10b-5. One concerns the ability of a private party to restrain a
continuing manipulation of corporate stock by insiders. This will be discussed at
pp. 512-13 infra. The other concerns the ability of the corporation to obtain an
injunction under 10b-5 to restrain a fraud against the corporation by outsiders. See
note 67 infra.
43. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) ;accord, M.L. Lee & Co. v. American Cardboard
& Packaging Corp., 36 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
44. 375 F.2d at 396.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 397.
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adverse effect on the securities market. 47 This indicates the court's concern that the particular activity before it must have a connection with
a purchase or sale. Thus, rather than relying on an arbitrary rule limiting standing, 48 the court stressed the connection which this scheme had
with the securities market. The Brod decision is sound in that it has
used the purpose of the Act to extend protection; yet, since it specifically
found a connection with the purchase of a security the court has limited
itself to matters properly in the federal domain.
Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc. 49 represents a case emphasizing the words "in connection with". The facts were similar to
Brod and the defendant urged the application of the Birnbaum doctrine,
but the court refused to follow that doctrine because to do so would
"fly in the face" of the congressional objective, and would
render unnecessary the words "in connection with". Its effect would
be to artificially restrict the statute to proscription of fraud "in the
purchase or sale" rather than "in connection with" the purchase and
sale of a security. The use of the words "in connection with" indicates that Congress intended to protect against fraud in agreements
to buy or sell, as well as with respect to completed sales, provided
damages could be shown."5 0
With Brod and Puretec protecting parties against fraud even though
a sale has not been consummated, it appears that the purchaser-seller
requirement will not be a bar to plaintiffs who have been defrauded in
situations involving an abortive sale or purchase transaction. 51 In such
a context a connection with a securities transaction is evident and the
only element lacking is the completion of that transaction. It would appear proper, therefore, to allow standing to bring an action under 10b-5
in this situation.
C.

Constructive Seller

In the previously discussed cases there has been an actual sale or
purchase transaction to which the "in connection with" language could
be applied to provide rule 10b-5 protection. The following discussion
will concern the extension of 10b-5 to cover parties who have been victims of fraudulent mergers and who received stock in the merged com47. Id.
48. See 375 F.2d at 397 n.3, where the court said:
Prior decisions in this Circuit [second] have been, on occasions, interpreted
as standing for the rule that only a purchaser or seller may bring a Rule
10b-5 action. . . . [citing Birnbaum]. The Commission, in recent cases, has
urged that this interpretation of the Act is too narrow ....

[see the discussion

of Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., p. 508 infra.] We need not consider that contention since appellant is clearly a purchaser of securities.
49. 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
50. Id. at 718. See Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
51. But see Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201
(S.D.N.Y.
1964).
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pany in exchange for their old stock. The extension includes situations
termed forced or constructive sales. It is forced because the volition normally associated with a sale is absent when a stockholder exchanges his
shares for stock in the surviving corporation and it is constructive since
the exchange element of a sale is present and the shareholder has disposed of shares, yet there actually has not been a sale.
In Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co.,52 plaintiff, a minority shareholder of
Crown Finance Co., Inc., sought damages under rule 10b-5 alleging that
defendant, acting in concert with Crown officers, acquired shares of
Crown by a tender offer for an inadequate consideration. Subsequently,
defendant completed a short-form merger of Crown into one of its subsidiaries. Although the plaintiff did not tender shares pursuant to defendant's offer, the court allowed the action. It determined that the harm
to plaintiffs was similar to that suffered by a normal seller and found
that the 1934 Act's definition of seller was broad enough to include protection for this type of transaction. 53 A specific determination of a sale
was then made. It may be argued that since this situation was labeled
a sale, Birnbaum has not been affected. Yet, the result-oriented analysis
of the court evidences a departure from Birnbaum's strict purchaserseller requirement. By stressing the type of injury which defendant's
fraud caused the plaintiff, it necessarily emphasized the "in connection
with" language of the rule and section. Furthermore, the court said:
The amicus brief [of the SEC] points out that the fraud alleged
here is properly regarded as in connection with the purchase of the
Class A stock, rather than a sale, since the wrongdoing emanates
from the purchaser. We accept this characterization and note that
it does not change the substance of the legal right involved.54
By adopting the SEC's view, and finding that this characterization does
not change the result, the court has indicated that it considers Birnbaum
as too restrictive and that the "in connection with" language of 10b-5
should be read more expansively. 55
Another significant decision allowing a private party to attack a
merger under lOb-5 notwithstanding his continuing shareholder status is
the Seventh Circuit case of Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp. 5 Plaintiffs
brought a derivative action against officers and directors of Susquehanna
seeking damages under rule lOb-5. It was alleged that the directors devised a plan by which the corporation would indirectly purchase its own
stock from the directors at an inflated price. This was accomplished by
the directors selling their stock to another corporation, which was sub52. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
53. 374 F.2d at 634; accord, Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968),

petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3284 (U.S., Jan. 23, 1969) (No. 970). See Voege
v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
54. 374 F.2d at 635 (emphasis added).
55. But see Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968), where the
court indicated a more narrow reading of Vine was required.
56. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967).
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sequently merged into defendant corporation. Two judges on a three
judge panel joined in a concurring opinion which illustrated the court's
concern with the "in connection with" requirement. They first determined that a statutory merger involved a sale of securities within the
Securities Exchange Act and that the act's purpose would be served by
a holding to that effect when the anti-fraud provisions are in controversy.57
Having found a sale the court analyzed the facts to determine whether
the directors' activities were proscribed by lOb-5. They distinguished
Birnbaum's holding that lOb-5 was not applicable to a breach of fiduciary
duty by a corporate insider by finding that the corporation was specifically
suing as a defrauded seller or buyer. 58 Thus, the court found a nexus
with a security transaction which would render lOb-5 applicable.
Since there was a specific finding of a purchase and sale, Dasho,
like Vine, does not appear to be much of a departure from Birnbum.
It is significant, however, in that once again a court has used the congressional purpose to find lOb-5 coverage. Also, the Dasho concurring
opinion did not discuss Birnbaum until after it found a "sale", i.e., when
it was making a determination of whether a fraud was perpetrated by
directors in violation of lOb-5.
The Dasho concurring opinion suggests an approach courts should
take when deciding a lOb-5 case. A two-step analysis should be used
to determine whether the fraud allegedly violative of rule lOb-5 is actionable, considering the rule's "in connection with" phrase. First, courts
should determine whether a securities transaction was affected by the
fraud, rather than looking for a completed securities transaction. Second,
it should be determined that the fraudulent securities transaction was
the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action. It is possible that a fraud will
be concurrent in time with a securities transaction, but instead of being
the basis of the plaintiff's claim, will only be incidental to it. One
example is the fraudulent scheme involved in Birnbaum. There, the
defendant director had sold his shares to another corporation at an increased price because he knew the latter wished to obtain control of
his corporation.59 If he acted in accordance with his fiduciary responsibility, the corporation would have made the profit by selling its assets
to the purchaser. This was no doubt a fraudulent scheme, and it involved securities, however, the basis of the fraud was the usurping of
the corporate opportunity. The defendant director's illegal profit was the
same that he would have earned if he purchased a profitable real estate
tract rightfully belonging to the corporation. Assuming the same monetary amounts, the loss to minority shareholders, the corporate plaintiffs
in Birnbaum, would be exactly the same in either the stock or the real
estate transaction. The Dasho facts, on the other hand, represent a
57. Id. at 268-69. But see Cohen v. Calvin, 266 F. Supp. 677, 681-83 (S.D.N.Y.

1967).

58. 380 F.2d at 269-70.
59. See p. 500 supra.
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situation which has a securities transaction as the basis of the lOb-5
claim. Although the situation appears similar in both cases in that both
decisions involve the transfer of control for an excessive premium, the
court in Dasho specifically found a purchase and sale of securities as
the basis of the fraud. There was a transfer of shares, albeit indirectly,
for an inadequate consideration. Thus, not considering the purchaserseller status of the plaintiffs, the "in connection with" requirement would
not be satisfied under the Birnbaum factual situation,6 ° yet can be found
in the Dasho situation.6'
Since the previously discussed cases limiting Birnbaum's strict purchaser-seller requirement have involved an actual, abortive, or constructive sale and were based on the legislative purpose of section 10(b), they
appear sound. The constructive seller cases, Vine and Dasho, and to
a degree the abortive seller cases, Brod and Puretec, since they all involved interpretation of the purchase and sale terminology involving an
actual securities transaction, would probably be approved by the Supreme
Court. In the first case dealing with rule 10b-5 to reach the Court,
SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,62 it upheld the Commission's use of 10b-5
to attack a merger of two insurance companies which was allegedly
achieved through fraudulent misrepresentations sent through the mails.
The Court used an expansive definition of seller to allow the SEC's action to proceed under 10b-5. The Court said:
Whatever the terms "purchase" and "sale" may mean in other contexts, here an alleged deception has affected individual shareholder's
decisions in ways not at all unlike that involved in a typical cash
sale or share exchange. The broad antifraud purposes of the statute
and the rule would clearly be furthered by their application to this
type of situation."
Although the Court specifically noted that its decision would not
affect the question of when a private party may bring an action under
10b-5, 64 as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent, determinations
concerning the SEC often apply to private parties. 65 Furthermore, since
the Court's holding in National Sec., Inc. is only an indication of the
manner in which they will read the terms "purchase and sale", it does
not appear that the use of its decision in this context is misplaced. It
would seem, therefore, that the expansive reading of purchase and sale
used by the courts in allowing an abortive or constructive seller to recover under rule lOb-5, has the Supreme Court's approval. When the
Court's holding in Borak concerning the use of congressional purpose as
a basis for extending private rights of enforcement under federal regula60. See generally Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
61. But cf. Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation To SEC Rule 10b-5,
supra note 6, at 689-90.
62. 89 S. Ct. 564 (1968).
63. Id. at 572.
64. Id. at 572 n.9.
65. Id. at 574 (dissenting opinion).
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tory statutes is considered, the various courts' reliance on the congressional
purpose also appears proper.
As a result of the abortive and constructive seller cases the criteria
for bringing a private action under lOb-5 appears to be an injury suffered
by a party as a result of an actual securities transaction, whether that
transaction is completed or not, as long as the fraud is "in connection
with" that transaction.6" The test, however, has been expanded to allow
plaintiffs an injunction under lOb-5 to restrain manipulations of stock
which are still continuing 67 i.e., where the securities transaction which is
connected with the fraud is in the future rather than in the past.
IV.

EXPANSION or THE "IN

CONNECTION WITH" CONCEPT

In Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,6 8 plaintiffs, shareholders
of S. H. Kress and Company, alleged fraudulent activity by the corporate
defendant Genesco and its chairman concerning Kress stock both before
and after plaintiffs became shareholders of Kress. The allegations of
fraud occurring before plaintiffs became Kress shareholders were that
Genesco acquired a substantial percentage of Kress stock by outright
purchase and through public tender offers, and by witholding information
concerning Kress' undervalued real estate. It was also alleged that defendants planned to sell this real estate to Genesco's pension fund for an
inadequate consideration to raise funds to pay for the Kress stock acquisitions, and that defendants planned to manage Kress solely for
Genesco's benefit.6 9 The allegations of fraud after plaintiffs became
Kress shareholders were that defendants financed the Kress acquisition
with Kress' own assets, that Kress was dominated and run for Genesco's interest rather than Kress', and the defendants manipulated the
market price of Kress' shares in order to purchase shares from Kress'
minority stockholders at a depressed value.70
The court held that 10b-5 was not applicable to the period before
plaintiffs became shareholders of Kress. It reasoned that at best the
basis of this claim was that defendants impliedly represented that they
would not mismanage Kress in the future, and that plaintiffs relied on
66. See Friedman, The Concepts of Purchase and Sale Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 14 N.Y.L.F. 608, 617 (1968).
67. This discussion will not be directed toward the related issue of the corporate
issuer's ability to obtain an injunction to enjoin a fraud by an outsider which affects
the price of the securities. Recent decisions indicate that such an action will be allowed.
See, e.g., Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.
1967); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967). Contra,
General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. D. Kaltman & Co., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 763
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) ; Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D.
Mich. 1966). For a good argument in favor of allowing this action, see Comment,
Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An Injunction for a Corporate Issuer?,
supra note 6.
68. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
69. Id. at 542.
70. Id.
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this when they acquired Kress stock. Holding that such a basis was insufficient to maintain a l0b-5 action, the court adopted the SEC's view
that this "would convert any instance of corporate mismanagement into
a rule 10b-5 case."'" The court distinguished Vine v. Beneficial Fin.
Co.,7 2 relied upon by the plaintiffs, by noting that there the defendants
making the alleged fraudulent offer were insiders and the plaintiff was
a member of the class deceived. Thus the court has limited "standing"
to bring a private cause of action under 10b-5 to persons who were affected by the alleged wrongful conduct. Since plaintiffs were not shareholders at the time of the alleged fraudulent transactions, they were not
78
harmed and, logically, no remedy was available to them.
The more significant aspect of Mutual Shares, however, is its holding regarding defendants' misconduct after plaintiffs became Kress stockholders. The court refused to allow damages for this period since a
monetary injury had yet to occur and the only "connection with" a
securities transaction was defendants' purchase of stock from other Kress
shareholders at depressed prices.7 4 Yet, it allowed the injunctive relief
sought by plaintiffs since the manipulative scheme was still continuing.
The court said: "While doubtless the Commission could seek to halt such
practices, present stockholders are also logical plaintiffs to play 'an important role in enforcement' of the Act . . . -76 It continued:
Deceitful manipulation of the market price of publicly-owned stocks
is precisely one of the types of injury to investors at which the Act
and Rule were aimed. Since private parties have the right to sue
for violation of the Rule, the broad remedial purposes of the Act
suggest that the judicial relief
available should not be limited to a
76
particular type of remedy.
The court has therefore used the congressional and administrative purpose of the Act and rule to read the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any securities" to allow a private party standing
under lOb-5, even though there has yet to be an actual securities sale
or purchase. It should be emphasized, however, that in permitting the
remedy the court spoke of the continuing manipulation of the security
markets. It did not use the plaintiffs' allegations that defendants' operation of Kress solely for Genesco's benefit and use of Kress assets to
pay for the Kress acquisitions was a basis for the lOb-5 relief. Thus,
the court has appropriately limited its holding to apply only to frauds
which affect security transactions.
71. Id. at 545.

72. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
73. See Comment, The Purchaser-SellerLimitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, supra

note 6, at 696-97.
74. 384 F.2d at 546.
75. Id. at 546-47.
76. Id. at 547.
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In light of the Mutual Shares rationale in determining that rule
lOb-5 would permit a private party the right to obtain an injunction, its
refusal to allow a cause of action to proceed for damages appears illogical. Although the lack of actual monetary damages would make more
difficult a plaintiff's proof of loss, 77 this factor alone should not be a

basis for dismissing an action without first permitting a plaintiff an
attempt to prove his damages. The court found that the only connections with the purchase or sale of any security on which plaintiff could
rely were the purchases by defendants from other shareholders. 78 Yet,
in allowing the injunction the court looked to the purpose of the Act and
determined that continuing manipulations of stock was a sufficient "connection with" the purchase or sale of a security. 79 It is submitted that

this same connection could be the basis of an action for damages if damages could be proved. Since plaintiffs were members of the group at
which defendants' fraud was aimed, they could be injured by the depressed value of the stock even while they still held it. The plaintiffs
could prove that the reduced price of the stock dwindled its value as
collateral for a loan, thus causing them to lose a business opportunity.8 0
Moreover, the Mutual Shares court cited Borak for the proposition that
relief available to private parties "should not be limited to a particular
type of remedy." ' Nonetheless, the court has limited plaintiffs to injunctive relief, when a manipulative device directly affecting the price
of securities is continuing, and could cause plaintiffs monetary damage.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York case of Entel v. Allen8 2 represents a successful attempt by a private
party to recover damages before he has become a party to an actual
securities transaction. However, because of the factual situation involved in the case, the validity of the case may be questioned. In Entel,
plaintiffs, stockholders of Atlas Corporation, sued individually and derivatively on behalf of Atlas, alleging a fraudulent sale of Atlas' interest in
Northeast Airlines to Hughes Tool Company. The allegations of fraud
were that defendants obtained shareholder approval of the sale by failing to
disclose that the sale was not at arm's length and that an inadequate consideration was paid for the stock. The court relied upon the Vine s 3 and
Brod8 4 decisions, concluding that these cases have appeared to overrule
Birnbcum's strict purchaser-seller requirement, thereby permitting the
lOb-5 remedy.8 5
77. See generally Comment, Private Enforcement Under Rule 10b-5: An Injunction For A Corporate Issuer?, supra note 6, at 624-25.
78. 384 F.2d at 546.
79. See p. 512 supra.
80. Comment, The Purchaser-SellerLimitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, supra note 6,
at 698.
81. 384 F.2d at 547.
82. 270 F. Supp 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
83. See p. 508 supra.
84. See p. 506 supra.
85. 270 F. Supp. at 70.
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This reliance on Vine and Brod has been criticized on the ground
that in both cases it was expressly found that a purchaser or seller was
involved. 86 The Entel decision warrants criticism but not on this ground.
Both Vine and Brod, it will be recalled, emphasized the congressional
purpose and read the "in connection with" language expansively in concluding that the type of fraud involved in those cases was properly within
the scope of lOb-5.8 7 Once it is established that this method of reading

the statute and rule is acceptable, it would appear permissible to determine whether the transaction before the court was the type of transaction which would affect a purchase or sale of securities and, thus, be
within the congressional purpose.88 Thus, the fact that Vine and Brod
eventually made a determination that a purchaser or seller was involved
should not be significant. Entel may be criticized, however, because it
failed to distinguish between the derivative suit and the class action.
The decision permitting the derivative suit appears correct.89 The corporation was a seller and was, therefore, defrauded by a scheme directly
pertaining to the sale. There was a securities sale by the corporation
which was induced by fraud, and this was the basis of the suit. 90 However, concerning the shareholder class action, the Entel decision rests
on weaker grounds. The basis of the shareholders' suit was the defendants' scheme of selling the corporation's interest in Northeast Airlines for an inadequate consideration. When the fraud is analyzed, it
becomes evident that plaintiffs were relying on a breach of fiduciary duty
for their lOb-5 action. The only injury which they suffered was a loss
to their corporation of a just price for its Northeast Airline stock. This
injury does not affect them as individual investors. Once again, therefore, it is important to distinguish between a fraud which directly affects
a securities transaction, and one which is incidently related to the purchase or sale of securities. 9 1 The plaintiffs, as shareholders, are the parties who must allege a fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction and, in this situation, the plaintiffs are relying on fraud affecting
the corporation.
The Entel decision represents a danger inherent in an unreflected
application of the theory involved in the decline of Birnbaum's strict
purchaser-seller requirement. It may appear anomalous to allow private
parties relief in a Mutual Shares situation when corporate securities are
being manipulated, yet deny relief when a fraudulent sale has taken
place actually causing harm to the plaintiff's corporation. Nonetheless,
86. R.

JnNNINCS

&

H.

MARSH,

JR.,

SECURITIES

REGULATION

CASES

AND

929 nn.13-14 (2d ed. 1968). See Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581
(2d Cir. 1968).

MATERIALS

87.
88.
89.
O'Neill
90.
91.

See pp. 506-08 supra.
See pp. 509-10 supra.
The court in reaching this result had to reject the deception requirement of
v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964).
See p. 513 supra.
See pp. 509-10 supra.
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a distinction is present. In the first situation there is a fraud "in connection with" a securities scheme which will harm the shareholder, while
in the second, the fraud is "in connection with" a scheme which instead
of harming the shareholder harms his corporation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The extension of lOb-5 to cover fraudulent schemes which are similar
to a purchase or sale and which will affect a future securities transaction
appears proper. Nevertheless, caution must be exercised lest the demise
of Birnbaum's strict purchaser-seller requirement open the door to allow
any corporate fraud to be remedied under rule lOb-5. It was said in
the Third Circuit case of McClure v. Borne Chem. Co.92 :

Section 10(b) imposes broad fiduciary duties on management vis-avis the corporation and its individual stockholders. As implemented
by Rule lOb-5 and Section 29(b), 93 Section 10(b) provides stockholders with a potent weapon for enforcement of many fiduciary
duties .

. .

. It can be said fairly that the Exchange Act, of which

Sections 10(b) and 29(b) are parts, constitutes a far reaching fed94
eral substantive corporation law.

This statement together with the trend to read rule lOb-5 expansively
could be used as a basis for allowing private parties to seek remedies under lOb-5 for corporate fraud which only indirectly affects market prices.
Cases such as Britt v. Cyril Bath Co.95 and Lester v. Preco Indus., Inc.,9 6
where plaintiffs attempted to use lOb-5 to obtain redress for various acts
of corporate mismanagement and waste, should continue to have legal
validity.9

7

In the Britt case plaintiffs attempted to obtain a remedy for

defendant's fraudulent entrance into a royalty agreement with its principal shareholder in return for patent assignments by him to the corporation. The only connection with a security transaction was the defendant
corporation's purchase of treasury stock apparently in no way connected
with the fraudulent patent deal. In dismissing plaintiff's cause of action
the court said:
Even the most generous reading of the facts alleged in the amended
complaint fails to disclose a causal connection between this conduct
and any resultant purchase or sale of a security . . . [A]ny stock-

holder could plausibly argue that in buying or selling shares he relied
on implied representations of management not to mismanage and
by such argument convert any instance of corporate mismanagement
92. 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
93. Securities Exchange Act § 29, 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (1964). This section voids
every contract made in violation of any provision of the Exchange Act, or any rule or
regulation promulgated thereunder.
94. 292 F.2d at 834.
95. 290 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
96. 282 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
97. 290 F. Supp. at 936; 282 F. Supp. at 461-62.
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into a Rule lOb-5 case ....
98 Allegations of directors' mismanagement coupled only to some ultimate speculative effect on the general
market for a corporation's stock is a much too tenuous connection
to support a claim under Rule lOb-5. °
This statement represents a sensible limitation to the extension of lOb-5.
The fraud being proscribed should be limited to that which pertains to
a securities transaction and affects the party seeking redress because
failure to so limit it will transform 101)-5 into a general federal law of
corporate fiduciary duty, a result which is not within the congressional
purpose of lOb-5.
Edward J. Ciechon, Jr.
98. The court here cited Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540,
545 (2d Cir. 1967).
99. 290 F. Supp. at 938.
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